ISO/TS 18683:2015 船舶への燃料としてのLNG供給のためのシステムと設備に関するガイドライン | ページ 6

3.1.1

as low as reasonably practical

ALARP

reducing a risk to a level that represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble, difficulty, and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained

3.1.2

boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion

BLEVE

sudden release of the content of a vessel containing a pressurised flammable liquid followed by a fireball

3.1.3

breakaway coupling

coupling which separates at a predetermined section when required and each separated section contains a self-closing shut-off valve which seals automatically

Note 1 to entry: A breakaway coupling can be activated automatically by excessive forces or though mechanical/hydraulic controls.

3.1.4

bunkering

process of transferring fuel to a ship

3.1.5

bunkering installation

piping, process components, instrumentation, and other hardware for the transfer of LNG from the supplier to the ships manifold

3.1.6

bunkering site

location dedicated for bunkering comprising the bunkering installations, port and jetty, and other facilities and equipment that should be considered in the planning of bunkering

3.1.7

consequence

outcome of an event

3.1.8

container

portable tank unit

3.1.9

drip tray

spill containment produced of material that can tolerate cryogenic temperatures

3.1.10

dry disconnect coupling

quick coupling which connects and disconnects with minimum LNG release and each separated section contains a self-closing shut-off valve, which seals automatically

3.1.11

emergency shut-down

ESD

method that safely and effectively stops the transfer of natural gas and vapour between the receiving ship and supply facilities

3.1.12

hazard

potential source of harm

3.1.13

hazard identification

HAZID

brainstorming exercise using checklists where the potential hazards in a project are identified and gathered in a risk register for follow up in the project

3.1.14

impact assessment

assessment of how consequences (fires, explosions, etc.) affect people, structures the environment, etc.

3.1.15

individual risk

probability on an annual basis for an individual to be killed due to accidental events arising from the activity

3.1.16

linkspan

type of drawbridge used mainly in the operation of moving vehicles on and off a RO-RO vessel or ferry

3.1.17

probability

extent to which an event is likely to occur

3.1.18

rapid phase transition

RPT

shock wave forces generated by instantaneous vaporization of LNG upon coming in contact with water

3.1.19

risk

combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm

3.1.20

risk analysis

systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk

3.1.21

risk assessment

overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation

3.1.22

risk contour

two dimensional representation of risk (e.g. IR) on a map

3.1.23

risk evaluation

procedure based on the risk analysis to determine whether the tolerable risk has been achieved

3.1.24

risk matrix

matrix portraying risk as the product of probability and consequence, used as the basis for risk determination

Note 1 to entry: Considerations for the assessment of probability are shown on the horizontal axis. Considerations for the assessment of consequence are shown on the vertical axis. Multiple consequence categories are included addressing impact on people, assets, environment, and reputation. Plotting the intersection of the two considerations on the matrix provides an estimate of the risk.

3.1.25

risk ranking

outcome of a qualitative risk analysis with a numerical annotation of risk

Note 1 to entry: It allows accident scenarios and their risk to be ranked numerically so that the most severe risks are evident and can be addressed.

3.1.26

safety

freedom from unacceptable risk

3.1.27

safety zone

area around the bunkering station where only dedicated and essential personnel and activities are allowed during bunkering

3.1.28

security zone

area around the bunkering facility and ship where ship traffic and other activities are monitored (and controlled) to mitigate harmful effects

3.1.29

stakeholder

any individual, group, or organization that can affect, be affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by, a risk

3.1.30

tolerable risk

risk which is accepted in a given context based on the current values of society

3.1.31

topping up

final sequence of LNG transfer to ensure correct filling level in receiving tank

3.1.32

water curtain

sprinkler arrangement to protect steel surfaces from direct contact with LNG

3.1.33

white water/mist/fog

mist/fog that will be generated by condensing humidity in air when in contact with cold surfaces during bunkering

Note 1 to entry: This fog will reduce visibility and can mask minor leaks.