ISO/IEC 18013-3:2017 情報技術—個人識別— ISO準拠の運転免許証—パート3：アクセス制御、認証、および整合性の検証 | ページ 6

3.1

active authentication

mechanism that uses information stored in a secure area of a secure integrated circuit (SIC) (3.17) to confirm that the SIC and the other machine-readable data were issued together

Note 1 to entry: See 8.2.

3.2

basic access protection

BAP

mechanism to confirm that an inspection system (IS) has physical access to a proximity integrated circuit card (PICC) before the IS is allowed access to the data stored on the PICC and to ensure that communication between the IS and the PICC (once access is authorized) is protected

Note 1 to entry: See 8.5 and Annex B.

3.3

chip authentication

ephemeral-static key agreement protocol that provides authentication of the secure integrated circuit (3.17) and strong secure messaging

Note 1 to entry: See 8.6.

3.4

clone

unauthorized exact copy of a document that has the same security characteristics as the original document and that cannot be distinguished from the legitimate one

3.5

eavesdropping

unauthorized interception and interpretation of information-bearing emanations

[SOURCE:ISO/IEC 2382‑8:2015, 08.05.25, modified]

3.6

extended access control v1

EACv1

protocol used to limit access to optional signature and biometric data groups

Note 1 to entry: See 8.6 and Annex D.

3.7

input string

string of characters printed on an ISO-compliant driving licence [as human-readable text, optionally (or by specification) accompanied by or consisting of a machine-readable rendering thereof] used as input (either manually or automatically through the use of suitable equipment) for the non-match alert and BAP (3.2) or PACE (3.10) mechanisms

3.8

issuing authority

ia

licensing authority (or issuing country if separate licensing authorities have not been authorized) which applies a digital signature to an ISO-compliant driving licence and is responsible for the associated key management

[SOURCE:ISO/IEC 18013‑1]

3.9

non-match alert

mechanism to detect any differences between the machine-readable information and (some of) the human-readable information on an ISO-compliant driving licence

Note 1 to entry: See 8.4.

3.10

PACE

alternative mechanism to BAP to confirm that an inspection system (IS) has physical access to a secure integrated circuit (SIC) (3.17) on a driving licence card before the IS is allowed to access to the data stored on the SIC and to establish a secure communication channel between the IS and SIC once access is authorised

Note 1 to entry: As stated in TR-PACE, PACE refers to PACE v2.

Note 2 to entry: See 8.7 and Annex C.

3.11

passive authentication

mechanism to confirm that machine-readable data on an ISO-compliant driving licence (IDL) has not been changed since the IDL was issued

Note 1 to entry: See 8.1.

3.12

pseudo issuing authority

PIA

authority that does not issue ISO-compliant driving licences [but that is similar to an issuing authority (IA) (3.8) in all other respects] and which does not issue document keys, but which does have a root key pair with which it can sign documents of other IAs or PIAs that it trusts

3.13

public key infrastructure

PKI

technologies and products using public key (asymmetric) cryptography

Note 1 to entry: Both passive authentication (3.11) and extended access protection use this technology.

3.14

reading authority

RA

authorized entity reading the machine-readable data on an ISO-compliant driving licence (IDL)

Note 1 to entry: Driving licence authorities other than the authority that issued the IDL and law enforcement authorities are examples of reading authorities.

3.15

reference string

string of characters used as a reference against which to compare the input string (3.7) when using the non-match alert (3.9) mechanism, and used for session key calculation purposes by the secure integrated circuit (3.17) during execution of the basic access protection (3.2) mechanism

3.16

scanning area identifier

SAI

one or more graphical elements that demarcate an input string (3.7)

3.17

secure integrated circuit

SIC

integrated circuit that includes both a security feature (or security features), and memory and/or a central processing unit

Note 1 to entry: An integrated circuit card with contacts and a proximity integrated circuit card (PICC) are examples of a SIC.

Note 2 to entry: A SIC can be embedded in different solutions, for example in ID-1 sized cards (as used for the ISO-compliant driving licence) and in a booklet (as found in passports).

3.18

secure memory

integrated circuit (IC) memory of which the content [once populated by an issuing authority (3.8) during the personalization process] is accessible only by the IC operating system for internal use, and cannot be made available by the operating system to any reading device

3.19

skimming

reading data from a proximity integrated circuit card (PICC) without the card holder's awareness

3.20

trust chain

sequential set of trust points (3.23) that a verifying authority (3.26) references to verify a specific issuing authority's (3.8) public root key

3.21

trust model

description of the functional and logical aspects of a traditional public key infrastructure (3.13) , specifically excluding technical implementation details

3.22

trust network

component of a trust model (3.21) that describes the trust relationships and chains between issuing authorities

3.23

trust point

issuing authority (3.8) or pseudo issuing authority (3.12) that publishes a trust list (and the related public root keys) that verifying entities can reference

3.24

twinning

copying the data and/or integrated circuit of a physically and/or biometrically similar driver to the attacker’s integrated circuit or ISO-compliant driving licence

3.25

unpacked BCD

binary coding of a sequence of integers using 4 bits for each integer (where the bit weights are 8421) and encoding one integer in the least significant bits of each byte

Note 1 to entry: Only unsigned BCD is used in this document.

3.26

verifying authority

VA

verifying entity (3.27) that is part of a trust network (3.22) , i.e. that also is an issuing authority (3.8) or a pseudo issuing authority (3.12)

Note 1 to entry: Not all verifying entities are VAs. A car rental company can be a verifying entity, but is not a VA as it is not part of the trust network.

Note 2 to entry: VAs can be divided into immediate VAs (3.26.1) and non-immediate VAs (3.26.2) .

3.26.1

immediate VA

VA (3.26) that acquired the public root key of the issuing authority (3.8) via out-of-band means

3.26.2

non-immediate VA

VA (3.26) that acquired the public root key of the issuing authority (3.8) from another VA

3.27

verifying entity

entity that tries to determine if a digital signature is valid (i.e. if the data to which a certificate has been applied has not been changed, and if the signature was generated by the issuing authority (3.8) the verifying entity expects)