ISO/IEC 21827:2008 情報技術—セキュリティ技術—システムセキュリティエンジニアリング—機能成熟度モデル®（SSE-CMM®） | ページ 6

3.1

accountability

property that ensures that the actions of an entity can be traced uniquely to the entity

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 7498-2:1989]

3.2

accreditation

formal declaration by a designated approving authority that a system is approved to operate in a particular security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards

Note 1 to entry: This definition is generally accepted within the security community; within ISO the more generally used definition is: Procedure by which an authoritative body gives formal recognition that a body or person is competent to carry out specific tasks [ISO/IEC Guide 2].

3.3

assessment

verification of a product, system or service against a standard using the corresponding assessment method to establish compliance and determine the assurance

Note 1 to entry: Adapted from ISO/IEC TR 15443-1:2005.

3.4

asset

anything that has value to the organization

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996]

3.5

assurance

grounds for confidence that a deliverable meets its security objectives

Note 1 to entry: Adapted from ISO/IEC 15408-1:2005.

Note 2 to entry: This definition is generally accepted within the security community; within ISO the more generally used definition is: Activity resulting in a statement giving confidence that a product, process or service fulfills specified requirements [ISO/IEC Guide 2].

3.6

assurance Argument

set of structured assurance claims, supported by evidence and reasoning, that demonstrate clearly how assurance needs have been satisfied

3.7

assurance Claim

assertion or supporting assertion that a system meets a security need

Note 1 to entry: Claims address both direct threats (e.g. system data are protected from attacks by outsiders) and indirect threats (e.g. system code has minimal flaws).

3.8

assurance Evidence

data on which a judgment or conclusion about an assurance claim may be based

Note 1 to entry: The evidence may consist of observation, test results, analysis results and appraisals.

3.9

authenticity

property that ensures that the identity of a subject or resource is the one claimed

Note 1 to entry: Authenticity applies to entities such as users, processes, systems and information.

Note 2 to entry: Adapted from ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996.

3.10

availability

property of being accessible and useable upon demand by an authorized entity

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 7498-2:1989]

3.11

baseline

specification or product that has been formally reviewed and agreed upon, that thereafter serves as the basis for further development, and that can be changed only through formal change control procedures

[SOURCE: IEEE-Std. 610]

3.12

certification

process, producing written results, of performing a comprehensive evaluation of security features and other safeguards of a system to establish the extent to which the design and implementation meet a set of specified security requirements

Note 1 to entry: This definition is generally accepted within the security community; within ISO the more generally used definition is: Procedure by which a third party gives written assurance that a product, process or service conforms to specified requirements [ISO/IEC Guide 2].

3.13

confidentiality

property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities or processes

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 7498-2:1989]

3.14

consistency

degree of uniformity, standardization and freedom from contradiction among the documents or parts of a system or component

[SOURCE: IEEE-Std. 610]

3.15

correctness

for specified security requirements, the representation of a product or system that shows that the implementation of the requirement is correct

3.16

customer

recipient of a product provided by the supplier

Note 1 to entry: In a contractual situation, the customer is called the purchaser.

Note 2 to entry: The customer may be, for example, the ultimate consumer, user, beneficiary or purchaser.

Note 3 to entry: The customer can be either external or internal to the organization. See ISO 9000 and ISO/IEC 15504.

3.17

effectiveness

property of a system or product representing how well it provides security in the context of its proposed or actual operational use

3.18

engineering group

collection of individuals (both managers and technical staff) which is responsible for project or organizational activities related to a particular engineering discipline

Note 1 to entry: Engineering disciplines include the following: hardware, software, software configuration management, software quality assurance, systems, system test, system security.

3.19

evidence

directly measurable characteristics of a process and/or product that represent objective, demonstrable proof that a specific activity satisfies a specified requirement

3.20

integrity

property of safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of information and processing methods

3.21

maintenance

process of modifying a system or component after delivery to correct flaws, improve performance or other attributes, or adapt to a changed environment

[SOURCE: IEEE-Std. 610]

3.22

methodology

collection of standards, procedures and supporting methods that define the complete approach to the development of a product or system

3.23

penetration profile

definition of the activities required to effect a penetration

3.24

procedure

written description of a course of action to be taken to perform a given task

[SOURCE: IEEE-Std. 610]

3.25

process

set of interrelated activities which transform inputs into outputs

Note 1 to entry: Adapted from ISO/IEC 15288:2002.

3.26

reliability

property of consistent behaviour and results

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996]

3.27

residual risk

risk that remains after safeguards have been implemented

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996]

Note 1 to entry: This definition differs from that used in ISO/IEC Guide 73.

3.28

risk

potential that a given threat will exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets to cause loss or damage to the assets

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996]

Note 1 to entry: This definition differs from that used in ISO/IEC Guide 73.

3.29

risk analysis

process of identifying security risks, determining their magnitude and identifying areas needing safeguards

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996]

Note 1 to entry: This definition differs from that used in ISO/IEC Guide 73.

3.30

risk management

process of assessing and quantifying risk and establishing an acceptable level of risk for the organization

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996]

Note 1 to entry: This definition differs from that used in ISO/IEC Guide 73.

3.31

security policy

rules, directives and practices that govern how assets, including sensitive information, are managed, protected and distributed within an organization and its systems, particularly those which impact the systems and associated elements

3.32

security related requirements

requirements which have a direct effect on the secure operation of a system or enforce conformance to a specified security policy

3.33

system

discrete, distinguishable entity with a physical existence and a defined purpose, completely composed of integrated, interacting components, each of which does not individually comply with the required overall purpose

Note 1 to entry: Adapted from ISO/IEC 15288.

Note 2 to entry: In practice, a system is “in the eye of the beholder” and the interpretation of its meaning is frequently clarified by the use of an associative noun (e.g. product system, aircraft system). Alternatively the word system may be substituted simply by a context dependent synonym (e.g. product, aircraft), though this may then obscure a system principles perspective.

Note 3 to entry: The system may need other systems during its life cycle to meet its requirements. For example, an operational system may need a system for conceptualization, development, production, operation, support or disposal.

3.34

threat

capabilities, intentions and attack methods of adversaries, or any circumstance or event, whether originating externally or internally, that has the potential to cause harm to information or to a program or system, or to cause these to harm others

3.35

threat agent

originator and/or initiator of deliberate or accidental man-made threats

3.36

validation

confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the particular requirements for a specific intended use are fulfilled

Note 1 to entry: Adapted from ISO/IEC 15288.

3.37

verification

confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that specified requirements have been fulfilled

Note 1 to entry: Adapted from ISO/IEC 15288.

3.38

vulnerability

includes a weakness of an asset or group of assets which can be exploited by a threat

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC TR 13335-1:1996]

3.39

work product

artifact associated with the execution of a process

[SOURCE: ISO/IEC 15504-1]

Note 1 to entry: A work product might be used, produced or changed by a process.